

(Hempel on 'received view')

"On the 'Standard Conception' of Sense Theories" (in Q & A Carl Hempel)

- 1) his view: include Bridge principles in theory
- 2) 'intuitively understood' vocab, not 'observed'
- 3) - often contain terms introduced in earlier theory
- never 'completely understood' a la. Camp
- 3) bridge princs in theory \Rightarrow status of core rules unclear on standard conctrol (p.221)
- terminology rules in modeling? (note stipulated by defn)
 \Rightarrow no analogue of his view (T = Internal princs \cup Bridge princs)
- 4) how does standard conception "exhibit logical and epistemic characteristics of theories"? (p.222)
 \Rightarrow no criteria for deciding whether a given sentence is in theory [but this is genuine epistemic state of all scientists?]
 \Rightarrow if axiomatization defines primitives, "logically more interesting to go deeper route" (p.224)

(cf. how Kolmogorov's axioms don't 'bring out meaning' of 'probability' - still needs to be fleshed out by in explicit fashion - Bayes, frequentist, propensity, etc.)

\Rightarrow 7 many diff't axiomatizations
 \rightarrow read quote on p.225
 \rightarrow [variety of standard axiomatization techniques
 \Rightarrow bring out relevance of which one can talk in 'fundamental' or 'primitive']

[but this is not relevant given epistemic view, assumptions of Camp, w/ his final]

since bridge princs are \uparrow new

- 5) role of 'received' concepts in natural princs
 \rightarrow most princs contain 'new' and 'old' theoretical concepts/terms
 [is this problem for natural Camp, who is just liberal in what one takes as 'observed', based on 'simplicity, epistemic intelligibility' of experimental procedures?]
 some princs used as Internal princs of bridge princs
 \Rightarrow Camp's criterion of empirical significance fails?
 [but necessity in his final account in "methodical use of theoretical concepts", it doesn't matter what counts as what, since one takes them over both \uparrow - even if core rules are made language-free?]

distinction between 'intuitively understood' and 'theoretical' - not empirically meaningful w/ respect to Hempel's view of logical structure

Lecture 1: Sense / Sense Theories - Hempel on Causation

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6) Status of CRR rules

- p. 231: can't all be 'true by convention', coz they are field contextual, possibly ~~empirical~~ empirical predictions that must be verified (causing a constant in diff't ways)
- Hempel's view does not presuppose analytic/synthetic distinction [but Quine was wrong]

7) specifying means of theoretical terms

- why think they can be specified purely by antecedently understood terms? (p. 232)
- new concepts may appear not specifiable by old ones
- we know this when we learn how to use & apply them, not by defining them via old concepts