

Semantics of Scientific Theories:
Study Questions for Lecture 3, “Carnap (10. Nov)”

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1. Think of all the pragmatic considerations that enter into the choice of a linguistic framework: is such a choice really as trivial as many commentators and critics would have one believe?
2. Why is the observable-unobservable distinction important for Carnap? What would be lost to his account without it? Are there other, similar, perhaps more reasonable distinctions he could rely on?
3. Why do correspondence rules not provide definitions of theoretical terms?
4. What work does the introduction of the Ramsey Sentence do in our understanding of the structure and semantics of scientific theories?
5. What is the analytic-factual distinction in a scientific theory, and why is it important for Carnap? How is it captured by the so-called Carnap sentence (*i.e.*, the sentence consisting of a material conditional, the antecedent of which is the Ramsey sentence and the consequent the theory itself)?
6. In what way did Carnap think that the interpretation of the theoretical terms of a scientific theory is always indeterminate? How does the Carnap sentence capture that idea?

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